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Abstract: Studies of Chinese soft power have emphasized its potential to ameliorate the security 
SｷﾉWﾏﾏ; ;ﾐS ｴWﾉヮ Cｴｷﾐ; ;IｴｷW┗W ; けヮW;IWa┌ﾉ ヴｷゲWげく WｴｷﾉW デｴｷゲ ヮWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗W ｷゲ ┌ゲWa┌ﾉが ｷデ ﾗ┗Wヴﾉﾗﾗﾆゲ ;ﾐ 
important alternative Chinese interpretation of soft power as a response to domestic security challenges. 
In order to address this omission this article uses a regime security approach to examine soft power in 
the Chinese context. Through an investigation of the Chinese concept of 'cultural security' the article 
reveals that Chinese analysts view soft power as having the potential to help the Chinese Communist 
Party solve an internal security predicament by enhancing regime legitimacy and national cohesion. 
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“ﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴが ﾗヴ けデｴW ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ;aaWIデ ﾗデｴWヴゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW Iﾗ-optive means of framing the agenda, 
ヮWヴゲ┌;Sｷﾐｪが ;ﾐS WﾉｷIｷデｷﾐｪ ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W ;デデヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ ﾗヴSWヴ デﾗ ﾗHデ;ｷﾐ ヮヴWaWヴヴWS ﾗ┌デIﾗﾏWゲげ ふN┞Wが ヲヰヱヱが ヮヮく 
20-21), is a popular concept in China. The term ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ WﾏHヴ;IWS H┞ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ﾉW;SWヴゲ ;ﾐS ｷゲ ﾐﾗ┘ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa 
the official lexicon of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ;ヮヮW;ヴゲ デﾗ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗W 
; ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴ ﾗa WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデｷﾐｪ けﾏWｪa-W┗Wﾐデゲげ ;ﾐS I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ W┝Iｴ;ﾐｪWゲが SW┗Wﾉﾗヮｷﾐｪ ; ゲデヴﾗﾐｪWヴ 
international media presence, pursuing foreign policies designed to improve its image as a responsible 
ヮﾗ┘Wヴが ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデｷﾐｪ CｴｷﾐWゲW I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ;Hヴﾗ;Sが ;ﾐSが ;デ デｷﾏWゲが Sヴ;┘ｷﾐｪ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W ;デデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ 
economic success has attracted internationally (see Zhang, 2012, pp. 623-626). Chinese officials appear 
to be most comfortable discussing soft power strategy in the context of culture, however, and often 
Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ デｴW デWヴﾏ けI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴげく TｴW P;ヴデ┞げゲ recent cultural reform policies, which it claims are 
necessary to achieve what Chinese President Xｷ Jｷﾐヮｷﾐｪ ｴ;ゲ I;ﾉﾉWS デｴW けCｴｷﾐ; DヴW;ﾏげ ﾗa デｴW ｪヴW;デ 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, are in part motivated by the desire to increase soft power (see CCP 
Central Committee, 2011). IﾐSWWSが Xｷ Jｷﾐヮｷﾐｪげゲ Cｴｷﾐ; DヴW;ﾏ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ｷゲ ｷﾐデｷﾏ;デWﾉ┞ ヴWﾉ;デWS デﾗ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ 
quest for soft power (see Callahan, 2015). 
At the same time, the topic of soft power has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars studying 
Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ international relations. Some researchers have attempted broad assessments of the strengths 
and weaknesses of Chinaげゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ふCｴﾗ ;ﾐS Jeong, 2008; Ding, 2008; Gill and Huang, 2006; Huang 
and Ding, 2006). Others have examined the intellectual history of the concept in China and explain how 
it has been reinterpreted (Glaser and Murphy, 2009; Li, 2009) or its relationship with other Chinese 
ideas about foreign relations, such as public diplomacy (Wang, 2008) or foreign propaganda (Edney, 
2012). Some have examined case studies of Chinese soft power policy areas or initiatives (Ding and 
Saunders, 2006; Paradise, 2009) ﾗヴ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴげゲ ｷﾏヮ;Iデ ﾗﾐ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ bilateral or regional relations (Shen 
and Taylor, 2012; Hall and Smith, 2013).  
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Amid this proliferation of research into Chinese soft power a common consensus has emerged that the 
ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴ ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗W ﾗa Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ｷゲ デﾗ ;ﾏWﾉｷﾗヴ;デW デｴW security dilemma generated by 
Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ヴｷゲｷﾐｪ ヮﾗ┘Wヴく “ﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ┗ｷW┘ ｷゲ ; ﾏW;ﾐゲ H┞ ┘ｴｷIｴ Cｴｷﾐ; I;ﾐ ;IｴｷW┗W ; けヮW;IWa┌ﾉ ヴｷゲWげ ;ﾐS 
ヴWS┌IW デｴW ﾆｷﾐS ﾗa ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ aW;ヴが ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW UﾐｷデWS “デ;デWゲ ;ﾐS ｷﾐ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ヴWｪｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗヴゲが 
that might trigger containment or balancing behavior. This approach is useful because it highlights an 
important reason why the concept of soft power has been embraced by the Chinese leadership even 
more than in its intellectual home of the United States. By focusing on foreign policy and emphasizing 
the security dilemma, however, this national security approach overlooks the relationship between soft 
ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ;ﾐS デｴW CCPげゲ ヴWｪｷﾏW ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞. Although previous studies have noted that in China soft power has 
a relevance to domestic politics that is not ヮヴWゲWﾐデ ｷﾐ N┞Wげゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉ aﾗヴﾏ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ of the concept (Barr, 
2012, p. 82; Glaser and Murphy, 2009, p. 20; Li, 2009, p. 28) and scholars have pointed out serious 
SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ┘W;ﾆﾐWゲゲWゲ デｴ;デ ┌ﾐSWヴﾏｷﾐW Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞が ゲ┌Ih as governance problems, 
ｷﾐゲデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞が ;ﾐS デｴW ヴWｪｷﾏWげゲ ﾉ;Iﾆ ﾗa ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞ ふWくｪく DWﾐｪが ヲヰヰΓが ヮく 73; Wang and Lu, 2008, p. 430), the 
relationship between regime security and soft power in China is yet to be explored. This article aims to 
address this omission and in doing so contribute toward building a more complete view of the sources 
of insecurity shaping Chinaげゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デﾗ soft power than is provided by a sole focus on national 
security and the security dilemma. 
The article begins by defining regime security and explaining the conceptual relationship between soft 
power and regime security, with particular reference to legitimacy and national cohesion in China. It 
then examines the discourse ﾗa けI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞げ ふwenhua anquan) in China to demonstrate that 
Chinese analysts are indeed applying the concept of soft power not only to national security but also to 
regime security concerns. In particular, the way that soft power has been applied to the realm of 
cultural security in China problematizWゲ N┞Wげゲ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ デｴ;デ AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ ;ﾐS CｴｷﾐWゲW ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ I;ﾐ HW 
mutually reinforcing (Nye, 2014, p. 22; 2013; 2011, p. 90; Nye and Wang, 2009, p. 22). The conclusion 
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emphasizes the importance of taking regime security into account when investigating soft power 
beyond the liberal democratic West.  
 
National security, regime security, and soft power 
 
The need to overcome the security dilemma by reducing the fear its rise provokes in others is one of 
Chinaげゲ ﾏﾗゲデ IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ and the most widely cited reason for China wanting 
to increase its soft powerく AIIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ Lｷ ふヲヰヰΓが ヮく ンヱぶが ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ｷゲ けヮヴｷﾏ;ヴｷﾉ┞ ┌デｷﾉｷ┣WS デﾗ ヴWa┌デW デｴW 
さCｴｷﾐ; デｴヴW;デざ デｴWゲｷゲが a;Iｷﾉｷデ;デW ; HWデデWヴ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ゲﾗIｷﾗ-economic reality, and 
persuade デｴW ﾗ┌デゲｷSW ┘ﾗヴﾉS デﾗ ;IIWヮデ ;ﾐS ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ヴｷゲWくげ DWﾐｪ ふヲヰヰΓ, p. 64) argues that in China 
the concept of soft power けデﾗ ; ﾉ;ヴｪW W┝デWﾐデが ﾏW;ﾐゲ デｴW ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW ﾗデｴWヴゲ ｷﾐ ┘ﾗヴﾉS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIゲ ┘ｷデｴ 
the goal of achieving great power status without sparking fully fledged traditional power politics of 
ｴﾗゲデｷﾉW H;ﾉ;ﾐIｷﾐｪ ﾗヴ ┘;ヴげく Iﾐ ｴｷゲ ;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴげゲ ヴﾗﾉW ｷﾐ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ヴｷゲWが Dｷﾐｪ ふヲヰヱヰが ヮく ヲヶヶぶ ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ 
デｴ;デ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ｷゲ ﾗﾐW ﾗa ヴW;ゲゲ┌ヴ;ﾐIW デｴ;デ ｴWﾉヮゲ けデﾗ SW;ﾉ ┘ｷデｴ aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ and 
IヴW;デW ; aヴｷWﾐSﾉ┞ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Wﾐ┗ｷヴﾗﾐﾏWﾐデげく ‘;┘ﾐゲﾉW┞ ふヲヰヱヲが ヮく ヱヲヶぶ ﾐﾗデWゲ デｴ;デ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ 
ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ ヮヴﾗﾏヮデWS H┞ デｴW WﾏWヴｪWﾐIW ﾗa ; けCｴｷﾐ; デｴヴW;デげ SｷゲIﾗ┌ヴゲW ｷﾐ デｴW WWゲデ ;ﾐS デｴWヴWaﾗヴW 
Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ I;ﾐ HW ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ けﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ヴW;Iデｷ┗Wが H┌デ SWaWﾐゲｷ┗Wげく N┞W ;ﾉゲﾗ Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ デｴ;デ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗaデ 
ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ｷゲ ｷﾐデWﾐSWS けデﾗ ﾏ;ﾆW ｷデゲ ｴ;ヴS ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾉﾗﾗﾆ ﾉWゲゲ デｴヴW;デWﾐｷﾐｪ デﾗ ｷデゲ ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗヴゲげ ;ﾐS デｴ;デ ゲﾗaデ 
power can help to reduce the effectiveness of regional coalitions that attempt to balance against China 
(Nye, 2011, p. 23; 2013). This kind of national security perspective on Chinese soft power helps explain 
why building soft power has become such an important task for the CCP. But we need to consider the 
possibility that domestic concerns over regime security are also driving China’s soft power project.  
‘WｪｷﾏW ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ヴWaWヴゲ デﾗ けデｴW IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴWヴW ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐｷﾐｪ WﾉｷデWゲ ;ヴW ゲWI┌ヴW aヴﾗﾏ ┗ｷﾗﾉWﾐデ 
Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ デﾗ デｴWｷヴ ヴ┌ﾉWげ ふJ;Iﾆゲﾗﾐが ヲヰヱヰが ヮく ヱΒΑぶく Iﾐ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I;ゲWが ｴﾗ┘W┗Wヴが デｴW ｷﾐゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW ヴWｪｷme is 
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ｪWﾐWヴ;デWS H┞ デｴW ヮﾗゲゲｷHｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ﾗa ┗ｷﾗﾉWﾐデ Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾗa けヮW;IWa┌ﾉ W┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐげ (heping 
yanbian)が ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷゲ ;ﾐ W┝デヴWﾏWﾉ┞ ゲWヴｷﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ aﾗヴ デｴW CCPが ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デｴW けIﾗﾉﾗヴ 
ヴW┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐゲげ デｴ;デ ｴ;┗W ﾗIIurred in some post-Soviet states (see Shambaugh, 2008, pp. 88-89). The 
けヴWｪｷﾏWげ I;ﾐ HW SWaｷﾐWS ;ゲ けデｴW ゲﾏ;ﾉﾉ ゲデ;デW ﾗa ヮWヴゲﾗﾐゲ ┘ｴﾗ ｴﾗﾉS デｴW ｴｷｪｴWゲデ ﾗaaｷIWゲ ぐ and/or are the elite 
that effectively command the machinery, especially the coercive forces, of the ゲデ;デWげ ふJﾗHが ヱΓΓヲが ヮく ヱヵぶく 
While this article uses the term regime security rather than state security, it should be noted that there 
is often no clear dividing line between state and regime security withｷﾐ ; けゲデ;デW-WﾏHWSSWS ヮﾗﾉｷデ┞げ ふGｷﾉﾉW┞が 
2006, p. 501) such as China, where there is significant penetration of the state by the Party. Despite 
Chinaげゲ ゲ┌IIWゲゲWゲ ｷﾐ SW;ﾉｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ many of the common sources of insecurity for developing states, such 
as permeability by external actors and susceptibility to armed conflict (see Ayoob, 1995, p. 15), two 
important sources of regime insecurity remain problematic for the authorities: lack of legitimacy and 
lack of national cohesion.  
For a political authority such as the CCP, legitimacy is determined by the degree to whｷIｴ ｷデ けｴﾗﾉSゲ ;ﾐS 
W┝WヴIｷゲWゲ ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ┘ｷデｴ ﾉWｪ;ﾉｷデ┞が ﾃ┌ゲデｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS IﾗﾐゲWﾐデ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ゲデ;ﾐSヮﾗｷﾐデ ﾗa ;ﾉﾉ ﾗa ｷデゲ Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲげ 
(Gilley, 2009, p. 11). In other words, the use of power must proceed according to rules, these rules are 
justified by widely shared beliefs, and the actions of those in subordinate positions provide evidence 
that they consent to the power relationship (Beetham, 1991, p. 16). There has been a great deal of elite 
discussion of Party legitimacy in China, particularly since the early 2000s; one study showed that 68% of 
ゲ;ﾏヮﾉWS CｴｷﾐWゲW ﾃﾗ┌ヴﾐ;ﾉ ;ヴデｷIﾉWゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞ デﾗﾗﾆ デｴW ┗ｷW┘ デｴ;デ デｴW CCPげゲ ﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞ ┘;ゲ ┌ﾐSWヴ 
threat, while 30% claimed the Party faced a legitimacy crisis (Gilley and Holbig, 2009, p. 343), and a 
more recent study found that Chinese intellectuals are more pessimistic about regime legitimacy in 
China than their Western counterparts (Zeng, 2014). For the purpose of this article it is not necessary to 
resolve the question of whether or not the CCP currently faces a legitimacy crisis, however, only to show 
that the potential for the party-state to lose its legitimacy is a serious source of insecurity. 
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The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, held in October 2014, provides clear evidence that 
senior Party officials are highly concerned about the legality ﾗa CCP ヮﾗ┘Wヴく TｴW PﾉWﾐ┌ﾏげゲ ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴ aﾗI┌ゲ 
┘;ゲ デｴW ﾐWWS aﾗヴ デｴW P;ヴデ┞ デﾗ けヴ┌ﾉW ;IIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ デｴW ﾉ;┘げ ふyi fa zhi guoぶ ;ﾐS ヮﾗｷﾐデWS ﾗ┌デ デｴ;デ けｪﾗﾗS ﾉ;┘ ｷゲ 
; ヮヴWヴWケ┌ｷゲｷデW aﾗヴ ｪﾗﾗS ｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWげ ;ﾐS デｴ;デ aﾗヴ デｴW P;ヴデ┞ デﾗ ヴ┌ﾉe according to the law it must first rule 
according to the constitution (Xinhua, 2014). Responsibility for the justification of Party power falls on 
the Central Propaganda Department, which utilizes a comprehensive network of institutions to attempt 
to reproduce the official discourse justifying CCP rule and suppress any rival discourses that might 
challenge it (see Edney, 2014). Lack of consent is also a problem that requires significant resources to 
overcome. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in recent years the annual number of 
major protests in China has exceeded 100,000 (Huang, 2012). While all states use domestic force to 
ゲﾗﾏW W┝デWﾐデ ふゲWW B┌┣;ﾐが ヱΓΒンが ヮく ヶΑぶが デｴW CｴｷﾐWゲW ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデｷWゲげ ｴ┌ｪW ｷﾐ┗WゲデﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ デｴW ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ 
apparatus, ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷﾐ ヴWIWﾐデ ┞W;ヴゲ ｴ;ゲ W┝IWWSWS W┗Wﾐ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ﾏｷﾉｷデ;ヴ┞ ゲヮWﾐSｷﾐｪ ふM;ヴデｷﾐ;が ヲヰヱヴぶが 
demonstrates that the lack of consent to CCP rule is widespread enough to be a cause for serious 
concern.  
Soft power is primarily relevant to the enhancement of regime legitimacy where a significant 
IﾗﾏヮﾗﾐWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉ ﾃ┌ゲデｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ デｴW I┌ヴヴWﾐデ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ ｷゲ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ デｴW ヴWｪｷﾏWげゲ ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ 
to improve the international status of the national unit. The international increase in positive attraction 
that is associated with a rise in soft power makes it easier for the regime to convince its citizens of the 
truth of its claim デｴ;デ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲデ;デ┌ゲ ｷゲ ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗ｷﾐｪ ┌ﾐSWヴ ｷデゲ ﾉW;SWヴゲｴｷヮ, where status is 
defined not only in terms of material capabilities but also in terms of social recognition. For the most 
part, evidence of an increase in international recognition and attraction could be used to bolster claims 
that the regime has ゲ┌IIWゲゲa┌ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗WS デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲデ;デ┌ゲ, regardless of whether soft 
power is a result of attraction to political values, culture, or foreign policies, or whether it is generated 
by the policies of the regime or sources within broader society. Some internationally attractive cultural 
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products can also be the work of dissidents or relate to aspects of culture or values that the regime 
would rather suppress, however, and these sources of attraction are difficult for the authorities to 
exploit.  
Chinese political elites feel a keen sense of obligation to restore the counデヴ┞げゲ ヮ;ゲデ great-power status 
(Deng, 2008, pp. 8-9) and show its people that China is globally respected and admired (Zhang, 2012, p. 
620). TｴW ﾉW;SWヴゲｴｷヮ ;デデWﾏヮデゲ デﾗ ;ヮヮW;ゲW SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲデ ;┌SｷWﾐIWゲ H┞ ｪ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ けa;IWげ aﾗヴ Cｴｷﾐ; 
abroad (Gries, 2004, pp. 120-121) and the party-state has often publicized statements of support or 
;Sﾏｷヴ;デｷﾗﾐ aヴﾗﾏ aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ ;ﾉﾉｷWゲ デﾗ SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デW Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲデ;デ┌ゲ ;ﾐS デｴWヴWH┞ HﾗﾉゲデWヴ ｷデゲ ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉ 
claim to rule (e.g. Brady, 2003, p. 228). If there is a broad-based growth in Chinese soft power, these 
statements are likely to become more common and more credible as the number and variety of foreign 
actors who are attracted to China increases. Moreover, international attraction デﾗ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲ┌IIWゲゲ ｷﾐ 
areas such as economic dW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデ W┝ヮ;ﾐSゲ デｴW ﾐ┌ﾏHWヴ ﾗa けﾐﾗSWゲげ ｷﾐ networks ﾗa けﾉWｪｷデｷﾏ;I┞ HWﾉｷWaげ, 
thereby reducing the marginal cost of persuasion and squeezing out alternative discourses that might 
challenge regime legitimacy (Gerschewski, 2013, pp. 26-27). This makes it easier for the CCP to claim 
legitimacy based on its success in moving China デﾗ┘;ヴS デｴW ゲｴ;ヴWS ｪﾗ;ﾉ ﾗa ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ けヴWﾃ┌┗Wﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげく 
Although national cohesion is a concept that is rather nebulous and difficult to assess, the regular 
references to cohesion in official CCP statements indicate that Chinese leaders are worried about 
cohesion and seek to improve it (e.g. CCP Central Committee 2011, 2013). As China has become a more 
plural society, generating social consensus (ningju gongshi) and unifying the people (ningju renxin) have 
become serious concerns for the propaganda authorities (Edney, 2014). According to propaganda chief 
Lｷ┌ Y┌ﾐゲｴ;ﾐが ;IｴｷW┗ｷﾐｪ デｴW けCｴｷﾐ; SヴW;ﾏげ ﾗa デｴW ｪヴW;デ ヴWﾃ┌┗Wﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW CｴｷﾐWゲW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWゲ 
cultural cohesion (Xinhua, 2013), while an early article on national cultural security published on a CCP 
website argues that if a country lacks cohesionねeven if it is strong in terms of other forms of 
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powerねwhen it faces challenges such as a natural disaster or foreign invasion it will けIﾗﾉﾉ;ヮゲW ;デ デｴW aｷヴゲデ 
Hﾉﾗ┘げ ふbu kan yi ji) (Yang, 2006). A lack of national cohesion can be a persistent problem for weak states 
that are unable to generate け; SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ;ﾐS ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ IﾗﾐゲWﾐゲ┌ゲ ﾗa ゲ┌aaｷIｷWﾐデ ゲデヴWﾐｪデｴ デﾗ Wﾉｷﾏｷﾐ;デW 
the large-scale use ﾗa aﾗヴIW ;ゲ ; ﾏ;ﾃﾗヴ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌ｷﾐｪ WﾉWﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ デｴW SﾗﾏWゲデｷI ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ ﾉｷaW ﾗa デｴW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげ 
(Buzan, 1983, p. 67).  
Normally soft power refers to ; Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ ;デデヴ;Iデｷ┗WﾐWゲゲ デﾗ aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌WﾐIｷWゲく To consider the 
possibility that soft power could enhance national cohesion, however, it is necessary to apply the 
concept of soft power to the relationship between domestic constituencies. In this sense the soft power 
of the political, social, and cultural core of the polity encourages domestic interest groups and 
individuals on the margins to want the same outcomes, such as stability and national cohesion, as the 
authorities at the center. Although this might seem to be a major step away from the traditional 
interpretation of soft power, N┞Wげゲ (2011, p. 19-20) argument that soft power is a key requirement of an 
effective counter-insurgency strategy and that dealing with the threat of terrorism requires the soft 
power of an appealing narrative that can win over mainstream society and prevent terrorists recruiting 
new members to their groups highlights デｴW IﾗﾐIWヮデげゲ potential significance for state efforts to respond 
to domestic sources of instability. In this case soft power involves enhancing regime security by making 
it less likely that domestic adversaries who pose a threat to national cohesion will be able to obtain 
material support from the local population, which then makes it easier for the state to deal with the 
security threat they pose. 
The authorities in Beijing face a range of threats to national cohesion from peripheral regions, including 
the ongoing problem of terrorism and insurgent attacks in Xinjiang, protests and discontent in Tibet, 
pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and de facto independence in Taiwan. In light of these challenges 
it would not be unreasonable for scholars or even the authorities to interpret the concept of soft power 
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as something that could also be applied to improve regime security by enhancing the cohesion between 
the political, social, and cultural core of the Chinese polity and those on the margins. Indeed, in more 
general terms, Wang and Lu (2008, p. 427) have pointed out that Chinese interpretations of soft power 
ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW けデｴW ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ｪWﾐWヴ;デW Iﾗﾏヮﾉｷ;ﾐIW ｷﾐ ; ゲﾗIｷWデ┞ H┞ ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉ W┝;ﾏヮﾉW ;ﾐS ヮWヴゲ┌;ゲｷﾗﾐげく 
Soft power is also ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ デﾗ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ヴWｪｷﾏW ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ HWI;┌ゲW デｴW ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗa other actors can 
constitute a threat to cohesion or CCP legitimacy. T;ｷ┘;ﾐげゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴが ;IIﾗrding to most Taiwanese, 
stems primarily from its democratic system and values (Wang and Lu, 2008, p. 432). The appeal of 
T;ｷ┘;ﾐげゲ SWﾏﾗIヴ;I┞ has increased international support for the Taiwanese authorities (Hughes, 1999, 
pp. 134-136), particularly in the United States, and thus undermines party-state efforts to push for 
reunification. The liberal democratic values that are a key feature of American soft power are also a 
source of regime insecurity in China and will be discussed further in the section on soft power and 
cultural security below. Non-state actors can also possess soft power (Nye, 2004, pp. 90-97) and in 
Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I;ゲW デｴW ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗa デｴW D;ﾉ;ｷ L;ﾏ; ;ﾐS Tibetan exile community can have a negative effect 
on party-state efforts to generate national cohesion. Dealing with these challenges is not as simple as 
improving Chinese soft power, since an increase in the attractiveness of one actor does not necessarily 
result in another becoming less attractive. When the values the CCP appeals to in order to justify its rule 
are incompatible with the values associated with the soft power of other actors, however, Chinese 
attempts to build soft power become more competitive and defensive. Li (2009, p. 33) points out that 
many Chinese analysts and other elites HWﾉｷW┗W デｴ;デ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ デﾗ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ IﾗﾏヮWデｷデｷ┗WﾐWゲゲ 
can reduce the influence of Western culture and defend against the infiltration of liberal political ideas, 
WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ┞ﾗ┌デｴく  
 
Cultural security in China 
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The rise in awareness of and appreciation for the concept of soft power has occurred during a period 
when the CCP is acutely aware of what it sees as the growing urgency of global cultural and ideological 
competition. Party documents regularly claim that the status and function of culture in the international 
competition for けIﾗﾏヮヴWｴWﾐゲｷ┗W ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ヮﾗ┘Wヴげ ｷゲ HWIﾗﾏｷﾐｪ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪﾉ┞ IﾉW;ヴ (e.g. CCP Central 
Committee and PRC State Council, 2012; 2005). From a national security perspective soft power is 
attractive デﾗ デｴW CCP HWI;┌ゲW ｷデ ﾗaaWヴゲ ; ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW ゲﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ デｴW ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ SｷﾉWﾏﾏ; H┞ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ 
power to increase without a corresponding increase in the fear of others toward China. From a regime 
security perspective, however, soft power offers a potential solution to a different dilemmaねhow to 
gain the benefits of being open to international cultural influence and exchange without undermining 
domestic national cohesion or becoming vulnerable to ideological threats. In other words, soft power 
has a potential ヴﾗﾉW デﾗ ヮﾉ;┞ ｷﾐ Wﾐｴ;ﾐIｷﾐｪ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ けI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞げく 
The concept of cultural security is not new to China, but it came into greater focus around the time of 
the Sixth Plenum of the Seventeenth Central Committee in late 2011, when it was mentioned regularly 
in official and semi-official statements. Although there is no authoritative definition of cultural security 
in China, by examining official statements such as the 12th Five Year Plan, the semi-official articles about 
cultural security that have been published on the websites of the Chinese Communist Party and the 
PWﾗヮﾉWげゲ D;ｷﾉ┞, as well as the interpretations of Chinese scholars that appear in academic journals in 
China, it is possible to obtain a clearer idea of what cultural security means in the Chinese political 
context. The way these sources use the concept of cultural security demonstrates that it is an important 
aspect of security that involves shielding Chinese culture and values from foreign threats as well as 
enhancing the ability of Chinese culture and values to compete for international influence by 
maintaining their relevance and dynamism.  
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The policymaking process in China is largely opaque and it is not generally possible to discern the 
relationship between academic discussions of a topic and official policy. It is not uncommon, however, 
for top leaders to raise the importance of a particular concept without specifying its exact meaning and 
for the scholarly community to then attempt to define or analyze the concept in greater depth. This 
appears to be what has happened in the case of cultural security. During 2011-12, the period leading up 
to and just after the Sixth Plenum, 37 academic journal articles with cultural security (wenhua anquan) 
in their title appeared in the politics, military affairs, and law section of the CNKI database, which was 
more than the total number of similar articles for the years 1999-2009. Although the views expressed in 
such articles cannot be considered an indication of official policy, they can help to clarify the scope of 
debate and highlight common assumptions surrounding a concept such as cultural security. 
The Sixth Plenum, which focused specifically on the issue of cultural system reform, noted that the need 
to protect national cultural security is an important task that is becoming more difficult (CCP Central 
CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWが ヲヰヱヱぶく TｴW I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ IﾗﾏヮﾗﾐWﾐデ ﾗa Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ヱヲデｴ Fｷ┗W YW;ヴ Pﾉ;ﾐ ゲデ;デWゲぎ けF;Iｷﾐｪ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪ 
global ideological and cultural struggle, it is increasingly urgent to strengthen national cultural 
capabilities and international competitiveness, to resist the cultural infiltration of foreign hostile forces, 
;ﾐS デﾗ ヮヴﾗデWIデ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞げ ふCCP CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ;ﾐS P‘C “デ;デW Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉが ヲヰヱヲぶく TｴW 
term has appeared not only in official documents related to culture, however, but also in documents 
;ﾐS ゲデ;デWﾏWﾐデゲ デｴ;デ aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗﾐ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ｷゲゲ┌Wゲく Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが ┘ｴWﾐ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ “WI┌ヴｷデ┞ Cﾗﾏﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ 
was established following the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee in 2013 it included 
けI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞げ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ デｴW ヱヱ SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ ｷデゲ ヴWﾏｷデく WｴWﾐ PヴWゲｷSWﾐデ ;ﾐS GWﾐWヴ;ﾉ 
“WIヴWデ;ヴ┞ Xｷ Jｷﾐヮｷﾐｪ ﾗ┌デﾉｷﾐWS ┘ｴ;デ ｴW I;ﾉﾉWS Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ けIﾗﾏヮヴWｴWﾐゲｷ┗W ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ヮWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wげ ｴW 
included cultural security as a distinct category alongside military and social security (Shen and Wu, 
2014).  
12 
Chinese semi-official and academic sources provide definitions of cultural security that range from 
minimalist to exhaustive. For example, Wu (2014) simply defines cultural security as the health and 
development of national culture in areas such as ideology, values, cultural activities, and cultural 
ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷﾉW ;┗ﾗｷSｷﾐｪ デｴW デｴヴW;デ ﾗa けaﾗヴWｷｪﾐ WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲげ ふwailai yinsu). An article on the PWﾗヮﾉWげゲ NWデ 
┘WHゲｷデW デｷデﾉWS けHﾗ┘ デﾗ PヴﾗデWIデ N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ C┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ “WI┌ヴｷデ┞げ SWaｷﾐWゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ;ゲ ┘ｴWﾐ ; I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ｷゲ 
not replaced or assimilated by another, is able to maintain its unique character, independence and 
integrity, and is passed down through the generations at the same time as it continues to develop; 
national I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ｷゲ ┘ｴWﾐ ; ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐ ゲデ;デWげゲ ﾏ;ｷﾐゲデヴW;ﾏ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW SﾗWゲ ﾐﾗデ ゲ┌aaWヴ Wヴﾗゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗヴ 
destruction due to another culture, is able to maintain the integrity of its own cultural traditions and 
national character, safeguards world culデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ヮﾉ┌ヴ;ﾉｷデ┞が ;ﾐS ｷﾐIヴW;ゲWゲ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW 
(Zhang and Lao, 2011).  
Academic views on cultural security in China range from relatively liberal and cosmopolitan to more 
conservative and nationalistic, but despite this variation they generally share two core elements in 
Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐぎ ┘ｴ;デ Iﾗ┌ﾉS HW デWヴﾏWS ; けI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲﾗ┗WヴWｷｪﾐデ┞げ WﾉWﾏWﾐデ ;ﾐS ; けI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ SW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデげ WﾉWﾏWﾐデく 
The cultural sovereignty element of cultuヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗Wゲ ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ┌ﾐｷケ┌W Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴが 
┌ヮｴﾗﾉSｷﾐｪ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ヮﾉ┌ヴ;ﾉｷゲﾏが ;ﾐS SWaWﾐSｷﾐｪ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ デｴW W┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉ デｴヴW;デ ﾗa けI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐaｷﾉデヴ;デｷﾗﾐげ 
(wenhua shentou). For example, Zhang and Lao (2011) argue that Chinese culture faces many threats 
and challenges, particularly from the culture of Western developed nations, which use their economic 
power, technological superiority, marketing strategies, and political pressure to conduct cultural 
infiltration into other countries. Jia and Zhao ふヲヰヱヲぶ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ デｴ;デ けｷﾉﾉWｪ;ﾉ ヴWﾉｷｪｷﾗ┌ゲ ;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲげ ｷﾐ Xｷﾐﾃｷ;ﾐｪが 
under the influence of external hostile forces such as Islamic extremists, can pose a threat to cultural 
security because they can undermine the identification of ethnic minorities with the national polity, 
ヴWS┌IW デｴWｷヴ デヴ┌ゲデ ｷﾐ デｴW CCPが ;ﾐS WﾐIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪW ゲWヮ;ヴ;デｷゲﾏく IﾐSｷ;げゲ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ デﾗ┘;ヴS TｷHWデが ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ ｷデゲ 
ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ aﾗヴ デｴW D;ﾉ;ｷ L;ﾏ;が ｴ;┗W ;ﾉゲﾗ HWWﾐ ｷSWﾐデｷaｷWS H┞ CｴｷﾐWゲW ゲIｴﾗﾉ;ヴゲ ;ゲ ; デｴヴW;デ デﾗ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ 
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security (e.g. Li, 2010). Jiang Iﾗﾏヮﾉ;ｷﾐゲ デｴ;デ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ Wﾐデヴ┞ デﾗ デｴW WﾗヴﾉS Tヴ;SW Oヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS 
corresponding regulations on foreign cultural trade and investment has made it more difficult for China 
to maintain cultural independence and guide public opinion, while making Western cultural infiltration 
into China easier (2010, p. 90). Sun and Wang (2014, p. 107-108) note that certain countries, such as 
Russia, South Africa, Singapore, and Malaysia, view culture as an issue of sovereignty and attempt to 
maintain cultural security by bolsteヴｷﾐｪ ゲﾗﾏW aﾗヴﾏ ﾗa けｷﾐSｷｪWﾐﾗ┌ゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞げ ふbentu yishixingtai) or local 
┗;ﾉ┌Wゲ ｷﾐ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐき デｴW┞ ┗ｷW┘ デｴW CｴｷﾐWゲW IﾗﾐIWヮデゲ ﾗa ; けｴ;ヴﾏﾗﾐｷﾗ┌ゲ ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ ;ﾐS けCｴｷﾐ; 
SヴW;ﾏげ ｷﾐ デｴWゲW デWヴﾏゲく 
The cultural development element of cultural security involves ensuring that Chinese culture remains 
vibrant and becomes more internationally influential, while defending against the threat of cultural 
ゲデ;ｪﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ｷﾐゲ┌ﾉ;ヴ ﾗヴ けSWｪWﾐWヴ;デWげ デｴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪく Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが scholar Guo Caihua notes that although 
external thヴW;デゲ Sﾗ W┝ｷゲデが ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏゲ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ デｴW けSヴWｪゲげ ﾗa デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW I;ﾐﾐﾗデ HW 
overlooked when assessing threats to cultural security (Guo, 2013, p. 14). Another academic assessment 
of cultural security identifies weaknesses in Marxism and mainstream ideology as well as problems with 
national cultural development, such as cultural stagnation, lack of cultural innovation, and a lack of 
ability to transmit Chinese cultural products to the world (Han, 2004, pp. 12-13). As part of its section on 
speeding up mechanisms for reform and innovation in the cultural system, the 12th Five Year Plan 
includes a paragraph on developing a system of cultural management, where it refers to the need to 
けデｴﾗヴﾗ┌ｪｴﾉ┞ SW┗Wﾉﾗヮ デｴW I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ ヮﾗヴﾐﾗｪヴ;ヮｴ┞が ヮWヴaWIデ デｴW ﾏanagement of the cultural market, 
ヴWゲﾗﾉ┌デWﾉ┞ ゲ┘WWヮ ;┘;┞ SWｪWﾐWヴ;デW I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ヴ┌HHｷゲｴ デｴ;デ ヮﾗｷゲﾗﾐゲ ヮWﾗヮﾉWげゲ ゲヮｷヴｷデゲが ;ﾐS W;ヴﾐWゲデﾉ┞ H┌ｷﾉS ; 
ﾏ;ヴﾆWデ ﾗヴSWヴ デｴ;デ ｪ┌;ヴ;ﾐデWWゲ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞げ ふCCP CWﾐデヴ;ﾉ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ;ﾐS P‘C “デ;デW Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉが 
2012).  
When Chinese academics discuss cultural security they often do not clearly distinguish between culture, 
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values, and ideology. Jｷ;ﾐｪげゲ ふヲヰヱヰぶ SWaｷﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ｷゲ ;ﾐ W┝;ﾏヮﾉW ﾗa ;ﾐ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ デｴ;デ ｷゲ 
primarily focused on ideology. For Jiang, cultural security exists when: 
a sovereign nation is able to independently select its political system and ideology; resist the attempts of 
other countries to impose their ideologies or ideologically-led modes of politics, economics, or democracy; 
guard against the corrosion, destruction, and subversion by internal or external cultural elements; and is 
therefore able to maintain its own values, form of behavior [xingwei fangshi], and social order, protect 
national self-ヴWゲヮWIデ ;ﾐS IﾗｴWゲｷﾗﾐが ;ﾐS ┌ゲW ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞ ﾏWデｴﾗSゲ デﾗ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW デｴW ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIW ﾗa デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ 
culture (Jiang, 2010, p. 89). 
Despite differentiating cultural security from political security, Zhang and Lao (2011) also perceive 
cultural security to be strongly linked with ideological struggle and political values. In addition to 
claiming that Chinese cultural traditions, mainstream values, social sciences, and way of life are under 
attack from the hegemony of Western cultural products, language, academic theory, and holiday 
traditions, they state that in the ideological sphere there are Western hostile forces who are still 
engaged in plots to Westernize or split the country. One relatively early article on cultural security by 
Han Yuan views cultural security in terms of both ideology and national culture (2004, p. 9). Han argues 
that ideology provides the cultural basis for the legitimacy of state power and that national culture is 
also a source of legitimacy and national cohesion, therefore problems in either of these areas could 
spark a national crisis (2004, pp. 9-10).  
 
Soft power and cultural security 
 
In his own work and in collaboration with the Chinese scholar Wang Jisi, Nye claims that American and 
Chinese soft power does not have to be a zero-sum competition and can instead be mutually reinforcing 
(Nye, 2014, p. 22; 2013; 2011, p. 90; Nye and Wang, 2009, p. 22). Nye points out (2011, p. 90) that if 
15 
China and the United States can become more attractive to each other through the mutual growth of 
soft power then this will reduce the potential for conflict between them. If we only focus on national 
security and the security dilemma this argument seems sensible because if each side becomes more 
ｷﾐIﾉｷﾐWS デﾗ け┘;ﾐデ ┘ｴ;デ デｴW ﾗデｴWヴ ┘;ﾐデゲげ デhen this will lead to a growth in shared interests and greater 
cooperation to solve international problems; an increase in the soft power of one does not pose a threat 
to the other in the same way that an increase in military capabilities might. When we consider the way 
that Chinese scholars have applied the concept of soft power to the problem of cultural security, 
however, this mutual attraction scenario becomes more problematic. 
Although Chinese analysts do not generally identify a direct link between the threat of foreign soft 
power and the potential for the CCP to lose its legitimacy, their references to the undermining of 
socialist ideology, values, and national cohesion make it clear that they are concerned that certain 
elements of foreign soft power, particularly the attraction of Western-style democratic systems and 
values, pose a threat to regime security in China. Some scholars argue there is a deliberate soft power 
strategy on the part of the United States to target China. Han (2004, p. 11) refers デﾗ ; けﾏ;ﾃﾗヴ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ 
ﾗaaWﾐゲｷ┗Wげ H┞ デｴW UﾐｷデWS “デ;デWゲ デﾗ ゲヮヴW;S WWゲデWヴﾐ I;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ デｴ;デが ;ﾉﾗﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ 
ｴWｪWﾏﾗﾐ┞が ヮﾗゲWゲ ; ゲWヴｷﾗ┌ゲ デｴヴW;デ デﾗ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞く H;ﾐ ｷゲ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW 
UﾐｷデWS “デ;デWゲげ ｷﾐIﾗヴヮﾗヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ｷﾐデﾗ ｷデゲ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ;ﾐS IｷデWゲ N┞Wげゲ ┗ｷW┘ゲ ﾗﾐ ゲﾗaデ 
power to argue for the importance of culture for contemporary international competition (2004, pp. 
10-11). Jiang (2010, p. 89) argues that American soft power, in the form of American-style democracy 
and values, poses a particularly pressing challenge for China. He claims that Western countries are 
aware of the increasing importance of culture in the international competition over comprehensive 
national power and aim to use soft power to achieve けpeaceful evolutionげ in China. Jiang reels off a list of 
Iﾗﾏヮﾉ;ｷﾐデゲ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ WWゲデWヴﾐ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ┌ゲｷﾐｪ ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐ ヴｷｪｴデゲ デﾗ ｷﾐデWヴaWヴW ｷﾐ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ 
affairs, referring to Chinese patriotism as nationalism, denigrating Chinese collectivist values as closed 
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and backward, and promoting degenerate thought and cultureねsuch as materialism, hedonism, 
extreme individualism and pornography and violenceねデﾗ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ┞ﾗ┌デｴが ;ﾐS ゲWWゲ デｴｷゲ as all being driven 
by a strategic objectiveぎ けデﾗ SWゲデヴoy our common ideals and spiritual pillars [jingshen zhizhu], to 
Wﾉｷﾏｷﾐ;デW CｴｷﾐWゲW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ IﾗｴWゲｷﾗﾐが ぷ;ﾐSへ デﾗ Iﾗﾐa┌ゲW ﾗ┌ヴ デｴｷﾐﾆｷﾐｪげ ふJｷ;ﾐｪが ヲヰヱヰが ヮく ΒΓぶく “ｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴﾉ┞が H;ﾐ 
argues that the United States specifically targets China in a struggle over ideology and values and that 
this has consequences for national cohesion (2004, p. 12).   
Even when American soft power is not seen as a deliberate plot, Chinese analysts can still identify it as a 
source of insecurity for developing countries. Sun and Wang specific;ﾉﾉ┞ ヴWH┌デ N┞Wげゲ Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ デｴ;デ ゲﾗaデ 
power is not threatening to others when they write: 
As far as developing countries in the process of modernization are concerned, despite scholars such as 
Nye (especially American scholars) repeatedly emphasizing in their articles that soft power development 
ｷゲ けﾐﾗﾐ-zero-ゲ┌ﾏげ ;ﾐS ﾗa ｪﾉﾗH;ﾉ ﾏ┌デ┌;ﾉ HWﾐWaｷデが デｴｷゲ ﾆｷﾐS ﾗa ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW IﾗヴヴWゲヮﾗﾐSゲ デﾗ ; ゲヮWIｷaｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ WWゲデWヴﾐ 
(or American) political system and cultural environment; this will inevitably create a major conflict with 
otheヴ Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴｷWゲが ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘ｷﾉﾉ HW ┌ﾐ;HﾉW デﾗ ;┗ﾗｷS HWｷﾐｪ ヮヴﾗaﾗ┌ﾐSﾉ┞ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS ;Hﾗ┌デ けI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞げ ふ“┌ﾐ 
and Wang, 2014, p. 108). 
CｴｷﾐWゲW ゲIｴﾗﾉ;ヴゲ ;ﾉゲﾗ ┘;ヴﾐ デｴ;デ AﾏWヴｷI;ﾐ け;ﾐデｷ-Cｴｷﾐ; aﾗヴIWゲげ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ;I;SWﾏｷIゲ ;ﾐS NGOゲが ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴW 
National Endowment for Democracy, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House, threaten cultural 
security in Xinjiang (Zhao, 2012) and that cultural infiltration by foreign religious organizations, such as 
the 'Dalai Lama clique', militant Islamic separatists in Xinjiang, and Christian neoconservatives, also 
poses a security threat (Xi, 2011). From a slightly different perspective on soft power and cultural 
security, Xi (2011, p. 21) claims that foreign religious infiltration could undermine the soft power of 
Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉｷゲデ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞. Xi does not specify exactly what he means by soft power, but from the context 
it seems that he is referring to the ability of socialist ideology to attract Chinese domestic audiences. 
Discussions of cultural security in China not only identify foreign soft power as a threat, however, but 
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also refer to soft power as part of the solution to Chinaげゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞く  
If maintaining cultural security involves not only cultural sovereignty but also cultural development, it is 
clear that in a globalized world it is both impossible and undesirable to prevent cross-cultural interaction 
H┞が ;ゲ W┌ ふヲヰヱヴぶ ヮｴヴ;ゲWゲ ｷデが けIﾉﾗゲｷﾐｪ デｴW ヮ;ゲゲWゲ ;ﾐS ゲW;ﾉｷﾐｪ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げ ふbi guan suo guo). In its section 
on important directions for culture, the 12th Five Year Plan lists けW;ヴﾐWゲデﾉ┞ ヮヴﾗデWIデ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ 
ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞げ ;ﾉﾗﾐｪゲｷSW ﾗデｴWヴ ｪﾗ;ﾉゲ デｴ;デ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SW ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗ｷﾐｪ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ﾗヮWﾐﾐWゲゲが WﾐIﾗ┌ヴ;ｪｷﾐｪ CｴｷﾐWゲW 
I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW デﾗ けｪﾗ ﾗ┌デげ ｷﾐデﾗ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉSが ;ﾐS ﾉW;ヴﾐｷﾐｪ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ヮﾗゲｷデｷ┗W ;IｴｷW┗WﾏWﾐデゲ ﾗa aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ Iｷ┗ｷﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲ 
(CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council, 2012). The organization and implementation section of 
the Plan states that it is necessary to correctly manage the relationship between maintaining openness 
to the outside world and safeguarding cultural security; at the same time as upholding national cultural 
security the process of opening up to the outside world and learning from other cultures should 
continue. In late 2013 a Central Committee resolution on deepening reform continued to list the task of 
defending cultural security alongside the need to remain open to positive international cultural 
influences (CCP Central Committee, 2013). 
In this context of globalization, Chinese scholars and analysts have recognized that soft power offers a 
potential path to cultural security that does not involve resorting to international isolation. Along these 
lines, Sun and Wang (2014, p. 109) point out that it will be impossible to achieve the goal of maintaining 
cultural security by relying on tactics of state suppression such as setting up internet firewalls and 
HﾉﾗIﾆｷﾐｪ ｷﾐIﾗﾏｷﾐｪ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ヮヴﾗS┌Iデゲく IﾐゲデW;Sが デｴW┞ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ デｴ;デ デｴ;デ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ けﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴｷﾉ┞ 
SWヮWﾐSゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾗ┗Wヴ;ﾉﾉ ヴ;ｷゲｷﾐｪ ﾗa ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴげ ;ﾐS デｴ;デ Wﾐｴ;ﾐIｷﾐｪ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ 
けSWヮWﾐSゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW IﾗﾏヮヴWｴWﾐゲｷ┗W ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW ｷﾐ ; Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ ;ﾐS W┝デWヴﾐ;ﾉ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐaﾉ┌WﾐIWげ 
(Sun and Wang, 2014, p. 110). They argue for a pragmatic, confident, open, and plural perspective on 
I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ デｴ;デ H┌ｷﾉSゲ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ H┞ ;S┗;ﾐIｷﾐg cultural traditions, contemporary 
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core social values, and ideological security (Sun and Wang, 2014, p. 112). 
Indeed, for many analysts, responding to cultural security threats involves a strategy that looks 
ヴWﾏ;ヴﾆ;Hﾉ┞ ﾉｷﾆW ; ヮﾉ;ﾐ デﾗ Wﾐｴ;ﾐIW Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗaデ power, albeit one with particular Chinese characteristics. 
For example, Zhang and Lao (2011) argue for the need to maintain cultural security by strengthening 
Chinese culture rather than by limiting cultural interaction between the West and China. In addition to 
exhortations to maintain a cultural development path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, build a 
ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉｷゲデ IﾗヴW ┗;ﾉ┌W ゲ┞ゲデWﾏが ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴが ;ﾐS Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデ ; けゲデヴﾗﾐｪ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉｷゲデ 
I┌ﾉデ┌ヴW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげが デｴW┞ ゲヮWIｷaｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ aﾗIus on the need to increase cultural creativity to make Chinese 
culture more progressive, the need to move from being a country that is rich in cultural resources to one 
that is also strong in terms of cultural production, and the need to come up with creative ways for 
Chinese culture to reach the rest of the world. 
MﾗヴW IﾗﾐゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗W ;ヮヮヴﾗ;IｴWゲ デﾗ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ;ﾉゲﾗ SｷゲI┌ゲゲ デｴW ﾐWWS デﾗ ｷﾐIヴW;ゲW Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ 
influence but tend to place greater weight on strengthening the domestic sources of national cohesion 
and legitimacy. For example, Jiang puts forward three suggestions for how China can make use of its soft 
ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲ ｷﾐ ﾗヴSWヴ デﾗ けﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐ デｴW ヮヴﾗｪヴWゲゲｷ┗W SｷヴWIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉｷゲデ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴWげが ヴWゲｷゲデ WWゲデWヴﾐ 
Waaﾗヴデゲ デﾗ ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデW けヮW;IWa┌ﾉ W┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐげが ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗデWIデ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ふヲヰヱヰが ヮく Γヰぶく Fｷヴゲデが デｴW 
most important task is to build a socialist core value system, which will help unify different groups 
within society by increasing the attractiveness and cohesive power of socialist ideology; second, 
ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐ ;ヮヮヴﾗヮヴｷ;デW I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴSゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ｷﾏヮﾉWﾏWﾐデｷﾐｪ ヮﾗﾉｷIｷWゲ デｴ;デ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ヮヴﾗデWIデ デｴW ヮWﾗヮﾉWげゲ 
culture (which Jiang equates with socialism); third, implement a cultural security strategy based on 
developing the country, because for Jiang the soft power of culture ultimately relies on the support of 
political, economic, and military hard power (Jiang, 2010, pp. 90-91). Jia Youjun argues that the key to 
I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ｷﾐ Xｷﾐﾃｷ;ﾐｪ ｷゲ デﾗ け┗ｷｪﾗヴﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ デヴ;ｷﾐ ;ﾐS Wﾐｴ;ﾐIW CｴｷﾐWゲW ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ゲヮｷヴｷデ ;ﾐS ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ ゲヮｷヴｷデげが 
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┘ｴｷIｴ ｴW Iﾉ;ｷﾏゲ aﾗヴﾏ ; IﾗヴW IﾗﾏヮﾗﾐWﾐデ ﾗa I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ふJｷ;が ヲヰヱンが ヮく Βヲぶく H;ﾐげゲ 
recommendations for dealing with cultural security challenges include both strengthening culture and 
ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ;デ ｴﾗﾏW ;ﾐS ｷﾐIヴW;ゲｷﾐｪ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ I┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐfluence (2004, pp. 13-ヱヶぶが ┘ｴｷﾉW W┌げゲ ふヲヰヱヴぶ 
;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗Wゲ ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗ｷﾐｪ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Hヴﾗ;SI;ゲデｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ ﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ 
Iﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾐｪ ; けSWaWﾐゲｷ┗W デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデ ヮWヴｷﾏWデWヴげ ふsixiang fangxian) by using propaganda campaigns to 




It is important, as Rawnsley (2012, p. 125) points out, to けさSW-WWゲデWヴﾐｷゲWざ ﾗ┌ヴ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗa ゲﾗaデ 
ヮﾗ┘Wヴげく Tｴｷゲ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ ゲｷﾏヮﾉ┞ ; ﾏ;デデWヴ ﾗa W┝;ﾏｷﾐｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ けresourcesげ of states such as China and 
Russia, however, or pointing out the ways in which they do not conform to liberal normsねit also 
requires examining the insecurities that lie behind their soft power strategies. Chinese analysts working 
in this area not only view foヴWｷｪﾐ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ;ゲ ; デｴヴW;デ デﾗ Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ヴWｪｷﾏW ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ H┌デ ;ﾉゲﾗ ゲWW デｴW 
growth of Chinese soft power as a means by which to enhance aspects of regime security in response to 
the challenges of globalization. Through the lens of regime security, developing soft power in the 
IﾗﾐデWﾏヮﾗヴ;ヴ┞ CｴｷﾐWゲW IﾗﾐデW┝デ ;ヮヮW;ヴゲ デﾗ HW ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ; ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ デｴW ﾗ┌デゲｷSW ┘ﾗヴﾉSげゲ aW;ヴ ﾗa Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ 
rise to great power status but also part of a nation building or state making project.  
The distinctive Chinese focus on the domestic aspects of soft power, which has been noted by a number 
of scholars, is about more than just addressing a weakness in Chinaげゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ヴWゲﾗ┌ヴIWゲねit is also 
about addressing important regime security challenges. TｴW CCPげゲ ヴWｪｷﾏW ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ｷゲ デｴヴW;デWﾐWS H┞ デｴe 
ideological challenge of the West as well as by the attractiveness of alternative sources of authority 
ﾗ┌デゲｷSW デｴW P;ヴデ┞が ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴﾉ┞ ;ヴﾗ┌ﾐS Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ヮWヴｷヮｴWヴ┞く Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲデ;デ┌ゲ ;ゲ ;ﾐ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ;ヴｷ;ﾐ ヮﾗﾉｷデ┞ ｷﾐ ; 
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world dominated by liberal democratic norms is often presented as a factor that places limitations on 
Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ゲﾗaデ ヮﾗ┘Wヴ ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉく B┌デ ﾏﾗヴW デｴ;ﾐ ; ﾉｷﾏｷデ;デｷﾗﾐが Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ﾗ┌デゲｷSWヴ ゲデ;デ┌ゲ ｷゲ ;ﾐ 
incentive to develop soft power. The Chinese focus on domestic factors is not simply an indicator of 
Cｴｷﾐ;げゲ lack of soft power but also reveals a qualitative difference between the kinds of insecurities that 




I ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ﾉｷﾆW デﾗ デｴ;ﾐﾆ MｷIｴ;Wﾉ B;ヴヴ ;ﾐS V;ﾉWﾐデｷﾐ; FWﾆﾉ┞┌ﾐｷﾐ; aﾗヴ ｷﾐ┗ｷデｷﾐｪ ﾏW デﾗ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾆゲｴﾗヮ けTｴW “ﾗaデ 
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